The present article proposes a typology of the main varieties of uncertainty considered by economists and refines existing concepts. This typology combines three distinctions, between: substantive and procedural uncertainty; weak and strong uncertainty; and ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty. These concepts refer, or fail to refer, to factors such as: a lack of information; complexity; the (im)possibility of building probability distributions that are unique, additive and reliable; structural change; etc. When refining these concepts, the article pays special attention to the conception of social reality underlying each concept. It refers to what each concept may imply about the complexity and changeability of social reality and the limitations and creative potential of the individuals that inhabit this reality, in addition to, in some cases, the roles of institutions and the features of the process of technological change.
In the economic literature, there exist different conceptions of uncertainty, involving different types and not only different degrees of uncertainty. There are also similar conceptions under different labels. The differences or similarities among these conceptions are often unclear. The word "uncertainty" itself is widely used in economics, including the approaches that have dominated the discipline for the last century. In order to reduce the incidence of communication failures, one should not use the noun "uncertainty" alone, but accompanied by qualifiers. These should indicate that one is referring to a particular type that is not necessarily the same thing that someone else calls uncertainty. Some heterodox economists, for example, insist that they work with the concept of uncertainty while neoclassical economists adopt the notion of risk. This practice generates confusion because many neoclassical economists do use the word "uncertainty." Some of them also claim that the distinction between risk and uncertainty is pointless or that their concept of uncertainty includes risk as a special case, as shown below. Additional complications result from the fact that some developments in recent decades have allowed mainstream economics to incorporate stronger notions of uncertainty, with positive references to the seminal contributions of Frank Knight, John Maynard Keynes, Herbert Simon, and others. A clear distinction between concepts should reduce confusion and help us assess these developments and their consequences for the separation between mainstream and non-mainstream economics.
The present article is intended to make a twofold contribution to the economic debate on uncertainty. It proposes a typology of the main concepts of uncertainty used by economists; and it refines some of the existing concepts. Due to space constraints, the article does not apply the typology and refinements to provide a survey of the economic literature. Only brief references to a few specific economists or economic approaches will be made here. The main focus of this article is on uncertainty about the future, regarding events and the consequences of current behavior. No presumption is made, however, that this is the only relevant type of uncertainty or that behavior is always oriented to consequences.
The remainder of this article begins by briefly establishing, in the first section, three distinctions that help identify relevant concepts of uncertainty in economics: between substantive and procedural uncertainty; between weak and strong uncertainty; and between ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty. The subsequent sections discuss and contrast these different varieties of uncertainty in greater detail. The article ends with concluding remarks.
Three Distinctions: A First Approximation
In order to capture the gist of the argument, it is useful to briefly establish three distinctions, before elaborating on the different varieties of uncertainty.
The first distinction has been proposed by Giovanni Dosi and Massimo Egidi (1991) between substantive and procedural uncertainty. Substantive uncertainty results from "the lack of all the information which would be necessary to make decisions with certain outcomes." In contrast, procedural uncertainty arises from "limitations on the computational and cognitive capabilities of the agents to pursue unambiguously their objectives, given the available information" (145). The authors are explicit that these terms are used in analogy with Herbert Simon's distinction between substantive and procedural rationality. As defined above, however, procedural uncertainty is not mutually exclusive with all variants of substantive uncertainty.
The second distinction is that between weak and strong uncertainty. With weak uncertainty, an agent can form -or act as if she formed -a unique, additive and fully reliable probability distribution (a unique distribution is the only admissible one and
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has only point probabilities, as distinct from intervals. An additive distribution has probabilities that add up to unity or 100%. Reliability will be considered below, in the section on ambiguity). In contrast, strong uncertainty is marked by the absence of such a distribution, used either explicitly or implicitly. As originally proposed, this was a distinction between types of uncertainty caused by paucity of relevant and goodquality information.
1 More generally, however, it is not only the lack of relevant and good-quality information that prevents the construction of a probability distribution with those characteristics. Another factor may be the contrast between the mental and computational capabilities of the agent, on the one hand, and the complexity of the situation, on the other. Strong uncertainty may thus be substantive and/or procedural. Weak uncertainty is always substantive and is uncertainty about which state of the world, from a predetermined list, will occur.
The third distinction is that between ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty, two types of strong -and substantive -uncertainty (Dequech 2000) . The following definition of ambiguity, borrowed from Colin Camerer and Martin Weber (1992, 330) , is particularly useful as a starting point for distinguishing between different types of strong uncertainty: "ambiguity is uncertainty about probability, created by missing information that is relevant and could be known." This definition can be refined by noting that, even though the decision-maker under ambiguity does not know with full reliability the probability that each state or event will obtain, she usually knows all the possible events. Even when not completely known, the list of all possible events is already predetermined or knowable ex ante, regardless of what people do. Fundamental uncertainty, in contrast, is characterized by the possibility of creativity and non-predetermined structural change. Within the bounds imposed by natural laws, the list of possible events is not predetermined or knowable ex ante, regardless of what people do, as the future is yet to be created (an explanation of the sense in which this list is not knowable ex ante is given below).
These three distinctions are shown in Figure 1 .
A More Detailed Discussion: Introduction
In what follows, the above-mentioned types of uncertainty will be explained and contrasted with each other in greater detail. Each variety of uncertainty will be discussed in two related ways, not necessarily in this order: the respective characteristics of social reality will be identified; and those characteristics will be treated as implying a lack of knowledge. The concept of uncertainty has two dimensions, for it refers to a lack of knowledge that is the counterpart of a characterization of reality, including the individuals that are part of the social world (see Dequech 2004 for a detailed discussion of the ontological and epistemological aspects of uncertainty concepts, from a realist perspective). Each variety of uncertainty will first be described in terms of a basic concept and then through some refinements of this concept.
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Weak Uncertainty
The Basic Concept
In situations of weak uncertainty, individuals can, or behave as if they could, build unique, additive and fully reliable probability distributions. This category can be subdivided into two: Knightian risk and Savage's uncertainty.
Knightian Risk: Known Objective Probabilities
The first subcategory of weak uncertainty has been termed Knightian risk after Frank Knight (1921) . In situations of risk, as they are more often called, individuals can act on the basis of a probability that is objective (in the sense that any reasonable person would agree on it) and known.
In turn, this probability may be of one of the following two kinds: a priori or statistical probability. A priori probabilities can be attributed objectively by logical reasoning, without the need to perform any experiments or trials. For example, let us assume that a die is not biased. The a priori probability of the occurrence of any particular number in the throw of this die is 1/6. Statistical probabilities are relative frequencies. From the perspective of frequency theory, the probability of occurrence of an event A (P A ) is the limit of the relative frequency with which this event occurs among n events (e.g., how many times the number 1 appears in n throws of a die), as n approaches infinity:
Savage's Uncertainty: Subjective Probability and Uncertainty in Standard Expected Utility Theory
The second subcategory of weak uncertainty has been termed after Leonard Savage ([1954] 1972) , who developed the subjective version of standard expected utility theory. 2 Savage used the notion of subjective probabilities, originally developed by Frank Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti.
3 His own term was "personal" probabilities. While frequency theory conceives probability as a property of the real world, the subjective theory of probability is an example of approach that treats probability as a property of the way one thinks about the world, a degree of belief. 4 This theory claims that it is possible to assign precise numerical probabilities to virtually any proposition or event. Betting rates are the mechanism through which subjective probabilities can be inferred. How much would someone be willing to pay, at most, for a gamble (say, a lottery ticket issued by a trustworthy source) that pays 100 monetary units if the event A occurs and nothing if it does not? And how much would this person require, at least, to sell that gamble? If for both questions the answer is the same value P (that is, if P leaves this person exactly indifferent between betting for and against event A), then P/100 is this person's subjective probability of the occurrence of event A. More generally, probability judgements can be elicited from people's choices. This requires very precise beliefs, but presumably allows subjective probabilities to be assigned even to unique events.
Standard subjective expected utility (SEU) theory thus rejects the often-made association between uncertainty and the absence of measurable probabilities. The same applies to a distinction between types of uncertainty on these grounds.
The decision-maker chooses among acts. Each act, a i , has a consequence, c ij , depending on which state, s j , occurs (see Figure 2) . 5 A state of the world is "a description of the world, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed" (Savage [1954 (Savage [ ] 1972 . The set of states is exhaustive and defined independently of the set of acts. States are mutually exclusive and each state has a probability, p j . The expected utility of each act a i is the weighted average of the utilities of the several consequences, where the weights are the probabilities of the respective states: u(a i ) = ∑ p j .u(c ij ). Figure 3 summarizes these points about weak uncertainty. From the viewpoint of a radical subjectivist, the idea of objective probability does not make sense and all probabilities are subjective, by definition. From the viewpoint of a moderate subjectivist, objective probabilities may exist. Some of these objective probabilities may be known, while others may be unknown, so that Knightian risk can be seen as a special case of Savage's uncertainty, as shown in Figure  4 . In another distinction, it is fairly common for economists to associate not only risk with known objective probabilities -a practice that I have followed here -but also "uncertainty" with unknown objective probabilities (e.g., Harsanyi 1977, 8; Kreps 1990, 99) . 6 Savage's uncertainty is a more general concept than both. In any case, there is uncertainty about which state of the world will occur. Weak uncertainty can vary in degree, which can be measured either by probability itself or by the dispersion of a probability distribution.
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Some Refinements
The previous characterization can be refined by adding that the list of possible states is predetermined. Relatedly, social reality is implicitly characterized as simple or inhabited by people who have -or act as if they had -powerful minds and computers, but are not creative.
Strong Uncertainty
Apart from the important contrast with weak uncertainty, strong uncertainty is a rather vague notion. Although this notion may be useful for some purposes, it is insufficient for us to distinguish between the types of situation that have been opposed to Knightian risk and Savage's uncertainty. Using the term "strong uncertainty" does not indicate whether one has in mind procedural uncertainty, ambiguity, fundamental uncertainty, or any combination of these.
Procedural Uncertainty
The Basic Concept
In the case of procedural uncertainty, the part of reality that constitutes the decision problem is complex and populated by individual or collective agents with limited mental and computational capabilities.
The word "complex" is used here in the very general sense of "complicated" or "not simple." Perhaps similarly, Brian Arthur (1994) used the term "complication" as a substitute for "complexity." As Barkley Rosser (1999) explained, the term "complexity" has a few different meanings, which will not be discussed here. It suffices to say that "complication" is only one of them and that some of them need not be exclusively associated with the notion of procedural uncertainty.
Following Geoffrey Hodgson (1997) , we may distinguish between two problems: one results from large amounts of information, which Hodgson calls extensiveness; the other refers "to the density of structural linkages and interactions between the parts of an interdependent system" (668-669), which I propose to call intricacy. In my understanding, both problems lead to complexity of the environment relative to the agents' capabilities. For limited agents, even a problem of a large amount of information without intricate interrelationships may be complicated. This kind of statement is probably in accordance with the common usage of the term "complexity." To cite just one important example, Friedrich Hayek wrote, in his 1974 Nobel Lecture that "the social sciences . . . have to deal with structures of essential complexity, i.e., with structures whose characteristic properties can be exhibited only by models made up of relatively large numbers of variables. . . . A theory of essentially complex phenomena must refer to a large number of particular facts" (1989, 4, (6) (7) , emphasis deleted).
7
The fact that the concept of procedural uncertainty relates complexity to the agents' capabilities implies that what is weak uncertainty for some agents may be procedural uncertainty for other, less competent or less sophisticated agents. This illustrates the importance, for the conceptualization of uncertainty, of how we characterize individuals.
Some Refinements
To the basic characterization of reality as complex and inhabited by limited agents one may add the possibility of non-predetermined structural change and of creative behavior. The notion of procedural uncertainty is compatible with, and complementary to, the notion of fundamental uncertainty: a reality that is subject to non-predetermined structural change may also be complex; and people who are creative may also have limited abilities. This is the view defended here. I believe that all empirical cases of fundamental uncertainty coexist with procedural uncertainty, while procedural uncertainty may exist without the fundamental kind. This is depicted in Figure 5 . I do not mean to suggest, however, that fundamental uncertainty conceptually is a special case of procedural uncertainty. Their conceptual distinction has important implications for the theory of economic behavior (see Dequech 2006, 112-113) .
Figure 5. Empirical Cases of Procedural and Fundamental Uncertainty
Procedural Uncertainty Fundamental Uncertainty
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A more limited view of procedural uncertainty does not allow the possibility of non-predetermined structural change and of creativity. It excludes fundamental uncertainty.
8 A good example of a situation to which this view can be applied is the game of chess, which Simon was very keen on using to illustrate complexity. Humans have mental capabilities that are very limited to deal with such a complex game. There are hugely numerous possible sequences of moves, but we can think of only a small fraction of them. While all this implies procedural uncertainty, fundamental uncertainty is excluded: all the possible moves and their combinations are already predetermined. The rules of the game prevent the players from doing anything different. No truly innovative move is allowed.
Among the sources of complexity in economic life is the fact that the result of one's decisions depends on the decisions made by others. This interdependence generates procedural uncertainty about the consequences of one's action. This happens even in the application of a single logic of action, such as the market logic often emphasized by economists.
9
Procedural uncertainty comes in degrees. Even if the degree of complexity remained unchanged for some time, the degree of procedural uncertainty could vary with at least two factors. People's computational ability may change over time, with technological improvements, like the advent of new computers. In the game of chess, to use this example again, computers have become able to defeat the world champion (as Simon had predicted). Even if their computational ability did not change, with time people could adapt to a complex situation, achieving a better understanding of reality.
In economic contexts, the degree of complexity does, however, vary over time. Firstly, the very factors that increase people's computational capacity may affect the degree of complexity. Changes in information technology, for example, have dramatically increased the amount of information available to decision-makers. In this sense, they have contributed to an increase in complexity (via extensiveness). While technological advances allow an increase in the computational capacity of any particular agent, they do the same for other agents, thus increasing the complexity of interdependence (for a related discussion, see Koppl and Rosser 2002) . Secondly, the degree of complexity -at least as perceived by decisionmakers -depends, for example, on the institutional structure. Institutions such as contracts may reduce complexity, although they are inevitably incomplete. Organizations may exist because of contractual incompleteness and have structures that simplify individual decision making, even if they are also incapable of thoroughly eliminating procedural uncertainty.
Depending on how it is interpreted, procedural uncertainty may conceivably disappear with the passage of time. One may, however, find this possibility unlikely to materialize, be it because reality is so complex relative to people's abilities that it will never be well understood or because people's capabilities may fail to increase faster than the complexity of the decision situation.
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Ambiguity
The Basic Concept
In a situation involving ambiguity, the decision-maker cannot unambiguously assign a definite probability to each and every event because some relevant information that could be known is missing. The reference to missing information that could be known is particularly useful in applying the term "ambiguity" to the urn problems discussed by Daniel Ellsberg, whose 1961 article is now a classic reference in the ambiguity literature.
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Let us consider one of the hypothetical problems conceived by Ellsberg, based on casual observations that were later confirmed by actual experiments.
There are two urns containing balls that are identical in everything, except for their color. The first urn contains 100 balls, each one of which is either red or black, but the proportion of red and black balls is unknown. The second urn contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls. People offered gambles regarding the color of a ball drawn at random from urn 1 are indifferent between betting on red and betting on black. The same applies for urn 2. However, when asked whether they prefer to bet on a red ball being drawn from urn 1 or from urn 2, many people prefer urn 2, instead of showing indifference. The same applies if it is a black ball that is involved in the choice between urns. If one tries to infer probabilities from these choices in the usual way, the probabilities revealed in the choice among urns are incompatible with the ones revealed in the choice within urns, and contradict standard SEU theory.
Ellsberg suggests that something besides the desirability of the payoffs and the relative likelihood of the events is involved, namely the nature of information about the relative likelihood, or its ambiguity (1961, 657) . At this juncture, it is useful to resort to a distinction between the balance or implication of the evidence, on the one hand, and its size or completeness, on the other. For some authors, probability has to do with the former, while the latter affects the reliability of probability estimates as a guide to practical action.
11 Consider, for example, the Ellsberg's urn problem mentioned above. In both urns, the balance or the implication of the available evidence is not favorable either to a red ball or to a black ball being drawn. In the case of the second urn, however, the amount of available evidence is larger or more complete. The distinction can be further clarified if we consider only the first urn and imagine that more evidence becomes available in a particular way. Let us suppose, for example, that the color of two balls is revealed, so that we now know that one ball is red and the other is black, while we continue ignoring the color of the remaining 98 balls. The balance or the implication of the available evidence has not changed, but its size or completeness has. So has the reliability of probability estimates based on that evidence.
In contrast, the reliability of probability is not an issue in standard SEU theory. At best it is an issue implicitly solved by construction. Since probabilities are elicited from people's choices, people are implicitly seen as acting on the basis of probability judgements and taking these judgments as good guides to action.
Some Refinements
In the urn problems conceived by Ellsberg, the information about the contents of the urns in principle exists; it is just not made available to the decision maker. It is hidden information, rather than nonexistent at the moment of decision.
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In Ellsberg-type problems, it is relatively straightforward to discuss the evidence's degree of completeness. One can conceive the complete information in possession of which there would be no ambiguity. For example, in the urn problems mentioned above, information about probabilities would be complete if one knew the color of each ball in each urn. One can then assess how far short from complete information the actual information falls. Similarly, one can envisage what a fully reliable probability distribution would be in this case, and this provides the standard with which to gauge the reliability of another distribution.
Another important characteristic of Ellsberg-type problems is that even though the decision maker does not know with full reliability the probability that each event will obtain, she knows all the possible events.
A few works on ambiguity go beyond Ellsberg's urn problems and do not assume that the decision maker knows all possible events. Even so, this list of possible events is still predetermined or knowable ex ante. Agents are implicitly treated as incapable of creative acts. Still regarding the characteristics of agents, they may have extremely powerful minds and computers. This does not matter, as long as there is some information that is hidden from decision makers.
A situation in which a person does not know which event will happen but unambiguously assigns a definite probability to each and every event involves weak uncertainty, not ambiguity. Neither is there ambiguity when the lack of certainty about probability can be expressed as a fully reliable second-order probability. In this case, a person will conceive of a set of probability distributions rather than of only one, but will be able to unambiguously assign probabilities to each of these distributions (Camerer and Weber 1992, 331) . 13 Although ambiguity is a strong type of uncertainty, it is compatible with the hypothesis of utility maximization. Many of the formal approaches to ambiguity are generalizations of expected utility theory.
14 They relax some of the standard assumptions in order to deal with situations that are problematic for the standard theory.
Fundamental Uncertainty
The Basic Concept
The most elementary notion of fundamental uncertainty is based upon the characterization of social reality as subject to non-predetermined structural change.
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In this very elementary form, fundamental uncertainty is the lack of knowledge that results from such a characterization of reality. The first refinement of this elementary notion is usually already implicit in it and consists in describing social reality as inhabited by potentially creative individuals. By making this explicit, one arrives at the basic notion of fundamental uncertainty introduced at the beginning of this article.
Individual creativity manifests itself in many ways. Potentially creative individuals are capable of creating and acquiring new knowledge. Future knowledge is not knowable in advance, in the sense that we do not know exactly what we are going to learn over the next years and when we are going to learn it. This inability implies major problems for predicting the social and economic future, given that human beings are part of social reality and what they know affects reality. 16 Innovations provide the best example of human creativity and change in (applied) knowledge in the economic sphere. The introduction of innovations also causes non-predetermined structural change in economic relationships. At a minimum, innovation changes the structure of the market in which the innovating firm operates. Some innovations, however, have consequences that go well beyond the firm's market.
Schumpeter's ([1942] 1950) notion of creative destruction and his dynamic notion of competition come to the fore. Competitive forces in capitalist economies stimulate decision makers to innovate in search of extraordinary profits. There exists in such economies an endogenous pressure for something that both involves and causes a very strong form of uncertainty. Introducing an innovation involves uncertainty for the innovating agent(s), by definition: since an innovation is something new, not attempted before, its results are very much unknown at the time of decision. It also causes uncertainty for other individuals, regarding the impacts of the innovation on their activities. Competitors are prominent among these other individuals, even though they are not the only ones. The mere possibility of the introduction of an innovation by someone else already constitutes a major source of fundamental uncertainty. One may know that other people have an incentive to introduce innovations, but one does not know whether and when other people will actually do it nor which specific form the innovation will take.
Non-predetermined structural changes can also be of a more typically political, social, or cultural nature. They may involve and/or have a significant impact on preferences, work relations, the workers' and the employers' bargaining power, government decisions, etc. They also interact in a bidirectional way with economic innovations, so that the distinction should not be carried too far.
Non-predetermined changes may occur either as the intended or as the unintended consequences of people's actions. Surprises may then happen.
The problem is not merely that we do not have enough information to reliably attach probabilities to a given number of events. An event that we cannot yet imagine -in the sense explained above -may occur in the future. As we cannot imagine it in the present, we cannot attribute to it any probability. To be sure, one could try to define a residual category to include all the events we cannot currently consider, and even attach a subjective probability to this set of events, but there are at least two problems involved in such an attempt. Firstly, in Savage's original framework, for example, a residual category does not seem to make sense, as his definition of state requires that the latter be a description of all the relevant aspects of the world ([1954] 1972, 9). Secondly, the subjective probability of the residual category would not be reliable as a guide to practical conduct, 17 if it could be meaningfully defined at all. More generally, without denying that decision makers may still construct subjective probability distributions in situations of fundamental uncertainty, I argue that they should acknowledge the unknowability of a list of all possible events and the consequently limited guidance provided by these probability distributions (for a similar argument, see Crotty 1994, 113) . I do not assume that this normative argument is always valid in descriptive terms, as agents may not always be aware of fundamental uncertainty (see the discussion of uncertainty perception in Dequech 1999) .
We must question the very applicability of the notion of state of the world. In expected utility theory, states of the world are defined as independent of acts. Whatever the intended or unintended consequences of what people do, people's acts cannot create new "states of the world." This does not prevent one from using the traditional notion of state of the world to deal with ambiguity. In cases of fundamental uncertainty, however, the notion of state of the world as it is usually constructed cannot be used, because it assumes away creativity and unpredictable structural change caused by people's actions. Criticisms of expected utility theory in its own field are therefore inevitably limited.
A less restrictive notion of event, as something that can be endogenous to the decision process, is needed to allow for creativity. Technical change, for example, implies endogeneity of events (Dosi and Egidi 1991, 148) . Even eminent former supporters of neoclassical models like Kenneth Arrow and Frank Hahn (1999, 215) have acknowledged that innovations are an important endogenous source of uncertainty and that they do not qualify as part of the Savage state space. New events that occur as unintended consequences of people's acts are also endogenous.
If fundamental uncertainty were restricted to its basic elements, it could imply, or be synonymous with, complete ignorance about the future, without degrees.
18 This is not the case if some refinements are added to the basic notion of fundamental uncertainty, as discussed next.
Some Refinements of the Basic Concept: Institutions and Technology
The contents of the social world can be further elaborated by bringing institutions and some features of the process of technological change into consideration. This allows us to speak of ordinal degrees of fundamental uncertainty. A precise measure is not possible, because we cannot conceive precisely what the complete information would be.
Institutions
Institutions influence individual behavior and thought in crucial, sometimes constitutive ways. In their restrictive role, they are constraints. Cognitively, they provide information, incorporate practical knowledge, and influence the way in which individuals select, organize, and interpret information. In terms of motivations, institutions not only provide incentives, but also influence the very objectives that people pursue and the obligations that individuals attribute to themselves. By performing these and possibly other roles, institutions give stability to the agents' thought and behavior, which in turn contributes to the reproduction of institutions. This allows the degree of uncertainty to be much lower than it would be otherwise. Sometimes institutions may, however, contribute to the transmission of instability.
Different institutions characterize different societies. Fundamental uncertainty may exist in any society, but it assumes a particular economic form under capitalism. The basic institutions of capitalism are such that they foster change, particularly in the form of innovations. This is an important source of fundamental uncertainty, as argued above. The presence of the institution of money, with all its functions, including that of a store of value, causes fundamental uncertainty regarding the proceeds that decision makers will obtain from investment, production, or, more generally, from their portfolio of assets. This fundamental uncertainty inherent to any capitalist economy may be amplified by sophisticated financial institutions, such as speculative financial markets, while other institutional developments may counterbalance this effect.
Institutions may be formal or informal. Among the former are contracts, laws, and constitutions. If we adopt a concept of institutions that includes organizations, we can also add market makers and State agencies as formal institutions. In any case, the State has an important role in law enforcement.
Like other institutions, contracts play a restrictive role, constraining the behavior of economic agents. By doing so, they also perform an informational role regarding the likely behavior of these agents, thus affecting the fundamental uncertainty about the future values of nominal variables. Among these variables are, for example, money wages, stipulated by the labor contracts between workers and their employers, and the value of inputs, stipulated by contracts between producers and their suppliers. Also important are proceeds, sometimes stipulated by contracts between producers and their clients, and payments stipulated by debt contracts. All these nominal variables are costs for some agents and a source of income for others.
Contracts cannot, however, totally eliminate fundamental uncertainty. The very sources of fundamental uncertainty make contracts unavoidably incomplete. Another reason for their incompleteness is the contrast between the complexity of the environment and the agents' capabilities. In addition, not every transaction is covered by forward contracts (this allows money to generate uncertainty, even from the perspective of someone who argues that money comes into existence with contracts).
Finally, sometimes contracts may contribute to spreading rather than reducing fundamental uncertainty.
In addition to the law of contracts, several other types of laws help provide a stable structure to the economy, such as those regulating property rights, taxes, government expenditures, etc.
Another type of institution that may provide stability to a transmutable reality is a market maker: an agent (typically an organization) that has a publicly announced disposition to act as a residual buyer and seller of an asset or durable goods. The market maker is responsible for providing orderliness to the market of that asset or good, significantly reducing the magnitude of possible changes in its spot price. The announcement of a long-term policy of market making may reduce fundamental uncertainty, while discretionary instability on the part of the market maker may increase it.
Informal institutions include conventions and informal social norms, both of which can in turn include shared models in their mental dimension. Informal institutions are the ones mainly in charge of performing profound cognitive and motivational roles. They thus also have an important relation with uncertainty, even apart from their restrictive and informational roles.
Technology: Features of the Process of Change
The possibility of technological innovation is an important example of the structural changeability of social reality, leading to fundamental uncertainty. At the same time, some features of the process of technological innovation contribute to creating some order and the basis for some kind of knowledge, even in such a changeable reality. In this sense, technology performs a role similar to that of institutions.
19 Accordingly, even the uncertainty regarding innovations can be a matter of degrees (Freeman 1982, 149-150) . Dosi (1982) proposed the concept of "technological trajectory," which is in turn based on the concept of "technological paradigm" (see also Nelson and Winter 1982 on "natural trajectories" and "technological regimes"). By analogy with Thomas Kuhn's famous notion of scientific paradigm, Dosi (1982, 148 ) defined a technological paradigm as "an 'outlook,' a set of procedures, a definition of the 'relevant' problems and of the specific knowledge related to their solution." He then called a technological trajectory "the direction of advance within a technological paradigm." More specifically, a technological paradigm is "[a] 'model' and a 'pattern' of solution of selected technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected material technologies." A technological trajectory is then defined as "the pattern of 'normal' problem solving activity (i.e., of 'progress') on the ground of a technological paradigm" (Dosi 1982, 152) . Incremental technological innovations take place within previously existing technological paradigms, whereas radical innovations are associated with the establishment of new technological paradigms.
The relatively ordered character of the patterns of technological change is explained mostly by the paradigmatic cumulative nature of technological knowledge (Dosi , 1129 . The physical characteristics of the material technology used within a technological paradigm can also, in my view, be treated as part of the constraints that bound a technological trajectory within this paradigm. According to Dosi ( , 1127 , among the defining characteristics of a technological paradigm are the technical properties of an "exemplar," an artifact to be developed and improved, such as a car, an integrated circuit, etc.
Still according to survey of the innovation literature, the uncertainty involved in an innovative search is highest before a technological paradigm is established. Afterwards, there is a reduction in uncertainty, 20 as the paradigm constrains the development of technology over time, allowing the prediction of likely patterns of innovative activities in firms, industries, and countries.
21 Even in this case technological innovation is an example of nonpredetermined structural change.
A technological paradigm proposes a set of heuristics or prescriptions, including a "negative heuristic," which leads to the exclusion of some technological possibilities: "the efforts and the technological imagination of engineers and of the organizations they are in are focussed in rather precise directions while they are, so to speak, 'blind' with respect to other technological possibilities" (Dosi 1982, 152-153) . A parallel may be established between this and the idea that the existence of some institutions may reduce fundamental uncertainty by ruling out at least some events or outcomes which would be possible or more likely otherwise.
Some aspects of technological knowledge and of the process of technological learning and development are institutionally shared, and help define a technological paradigm. The discussion here intersects with the one about institutions. For example: "It quite often happens that prototypical problem-solving models, rules on how to search and on what target to focus, and beliefs as to 'what the market wants' become the shared view of the engineering community" (Dosi , 1128 . In addition to the informal institutions related to shared technological views, there are formal ones: "A paradigm is economically exploited and reproduced over time also through the development of institutions [schools, for example] that train the would-be practitioners" (1128) .
A large part of technological knowledge is tacit, and, as Hodgson (1993, 255 ) noted, tacit knowledge changes slowly. This reduces the volatility of the process of technical change.
The neo-Schumpeterian branch of evolutionary economics identifies another reason why technological change (as well as other types of change, for that matter) can be ordered: the existence of selection processes that limit the variety of visions and types of behavior (Coricelli and Dosi 1988, 141) . 22 Technological and organizational imitation has a similar effect, tending to reduce the variety of innovations (Dosi and Marengo 1994) .
Concluding Remarks
The present article proposes a typology that identifies the main varieties of uncertainty considered by economists and refines existing concepts.
This typology combines three distinctions, between: substantive and procedural uncertainty; weak and strong uncertainty; and ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty. When refining these concepts, the article pays special attention to the conception of social reality underlying each concept. It refers to what each concept may imply about the complexity and changeability of social reality and the limitations and creative potential of the individuals that inhabit this reality, in addition to, in some cases, the roles of institutions and the features of the process of technological change.
The article defends a particular conception of social reality as: both complex and subject to non-predetermined structural change; inhabited by individuals who have not only limited capabilities, but also the potential for creative thoughts and acts; characterized by institutions that affect individuals in profound ways; and often undergoing cumulative technological changes. Such a reality is characterized by both procedural and fundamental uncertainty.
In situations of procedural uncertainty and/or fundamental uncertainty, having information is not enough, in a twofold sense. In both types of situations, one has to select the available information and then organize and interpret the selected information; in situations of fundamental uncertainty, one has also to replace the information that is not available with something else, filling in some of the voids with inputs provided by spontaneous optimism and creativity (Dequech 1999) , and then has to interpret the selected information and its supplements. All this is done with the aid of a mental model, which is not naturally given to the agents. Both procedural and fundamental uncertainty create doubts about which model is the right one to organize, select, and interpret information, as well as to generate images of the future.
These requirements and difficulties are compounded when procedural and fundamental uncertainty coexist. In contrast, they are typically abstracted away in concepts of weak uncertainty and ambiguity in the economic literature.
Notes
1.
In Dequech (1997) , strong uncertainty was defined in terms of a lack of information. As the concept referred to information that, if available, would transform strong into weak uncertainty, it was implicit that this was relevant and good-quality information. The author is grateful to Marco Crocco (2003) for prompting him to make this explicit. The same comments apply to Dosi and Edigi's notion of substantive uncertainty. The reference made here to the relevance and quality of information may be useful when considering the possibility of deception. Agents may intentionally provide misleading information to other agents. The perception of uncertainty and the kind of uncertainty perceived depend on whether the decision maker considers the available information reliable in the sense of having a good quality, as well as on what this information is about (states, probabilities, etc). The agent may perceive weak uncertainty, ambiguity, fundamental uncertainty, or no uncertainty at all. 2.
The term "standard" is used here because of the existence of generalized versions of the more traditional approach. 3.
As noted by Kreps (1990, 103) and other commentators, Savage's formal treatment is quite complex. A simpler set of axioms than his is possible if one combines objective and subjective probabilities. 4.
For an extensive and profound discussion of probability as a foundation for economic theory, see McCann (1994) . 5. Figure 2 borrows the notation from Runde (1995) and generalizes an example given by Savage ([1954 Savage ([ ] 1972 . In some presentations of expected utility theory, probabilities are attached directly to consequences. A list of consequences and their respective probabilities constitutes a prospect. The equivalence between these alternative ways of presenting the theory is due to the biunivocal correspondence between states and consequences. 6.
Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa were influential in propagating this definition, but it should be noted that they defined uncertainty by referring not only to the case in which the probabilities of action outcomes are not known, but also to the case in which these probabilities "are not even meaningful" (1957, 13) . 7.
For these reasons, the author has decided not to follow Hodgson (1997) in restricting the term "complexity" to the second problem. 8.
The latter view of procedural uncertainty is the one ably criticized by Davidson (1996) under the heading of "epistemological uncertainty," as well as by Dunn (2001) , although these authors do not distinguish it from the other view. 9.
Another source of complexity is the coexistence of different domains of social activity, goals, etc., and the possibility of applying different logics of action. I shall discuss this elsewhere. 10. Although Ellsberg (1961) discussed other situations, it is his urn problems that scholars usually have in mind when referring to Ellsberg-type problems. 11. This is clearly reminiscent of Keynes's (1921) distinction between probability and weight. Like the subjective approach, Keynes's logical theory treats probability as a property of the way one thinks about the world. For him, probability is a degree of rational belief in a proposition, given a set of propositions regarding the available evidence, but it is not always fully reliable. 12. For Morris (1997) , problems in which objective probabilities are not known are such that there is some hidden information that is somehow available to others. Morris acknowledges that Ellsberg's experiments are set up in such a way that asymmetric information does not matter, but believes that practically all economically relevant cases are consistent with the standard SEU theory with asymmetric information. Regardless of how adequate Morris's interpretation of uncertainty may be for cases of ambiguity, it does not apply to cases of fundamental uncertainty (which are economically relevant), as shown below. 13. Camerer and Weber (1992, 330) point out some drawbacks of what they call the second-order probability (SOP) view. Regarding this view as a descriptive theory, they refer to experimental evidence that "subjects prefer bets on known SOPs to bets on ambiguous urns" in Ellsberg-type problems, as well as to experiments that violate the required conditions for known probability and second-order probability to lead to the same choices. Camerer and Weber also argue that "the normative case for replacing single subjective probabilities with SOPs has not been made." Finally, they state that "if a person cannot express a precise probability, she may not be able to confidently express a second-order distribution either, or a third-order distribution over second-order distributions, ad infinitum." 14. Charles Manski's concept of ambiguity is more restrictive, for it refers to a lack of knowledge of a probability distribution that "prevents a decision maker from solving an optimization problem" (2000, 416) . 15. This seems to be the notion expressed by Paul Davidson and others as nonergodicity. There has been some controversy, however, about the possibly conflicting meanings of this term. See Dequech (2006, 115-116) for some references. 16. This is Karl Popper's (1957) major argument for rejecting the belief that history has a predetermined end. I do not mean that it would have been impossible to learn something before the actual moment in which it was or will be learned. Matthew Wilson (2009) has raised pertinent concerns regarding the creation of possibilities. His arguments and questions require a more detailed response than can be provided here. 17. See Orléan (1987) for a treatment of fundamental uncertainty along these lines. 18. When speaking of complete ignorance, one should explain what the ignorance is about. One may argue that fundamental uncertainty does not imply complete ignorance because, first of all, people may be aware of fundamental uncertainty itself, as already mentioned. This is a special case of a more general argument: fundamental uncertainty does not imply complete ignorance about the present or the past. 19. In the same vein, Coricelli and Dosi (1988, 138, 140-141) identified "technological and institutional factors" as a source of relatively ordered patterns of change. See also Dosi and Orsenigo (1988, 19) , who referred more specifically to "technological and institutional knowledge." 20. For an attempt to express this argument with Keynes's theory of probability, see Crocco (2000) .
21
. To the extent that the existence of technological trajectories allows some predictability of our future (technological) knowledge, it qualifies Popper's argument discussed above. 22. Competition thus both stimulates the introduction of innovations and imposes restrictions on the expansion of variety in economic life.
